
On November
4, 2008, the newly elected President of the United States Barack Hussein Obama
told the world from Grant Park in Chicago “Yes We Can”. The top international
challenges in 2009, when his presidency began, were Iran, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, North Korea and China. The Arab Spring was still in the future and
the Middle East crises had not expanded to epidemic proportions. A couple of
years into his term the Arab world in general and the Middle East in
particular, became the crisis centre.
One after the other, Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Oman, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran exploded in an uncontrolled chain reaction setting all the efforts of the major world powers at nought. The emergence, consolidation and success of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Isis), with participants from over 100 countries is the latest test for the collective wisdom of the Obama administration in its final days.
Obama inherited two pressing US-sponsored post-war reconstruction programmes—one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan. He came to power with the promise that he would end the US intervention in the two. From the Oval Office, however, the world looked different. He fell in line with the assessment of his intelligence and defence agencies that US military engagement and domination is essential to maintaining supremacy on the world stage.
Obama’s biggest challenge was the Arab Spring beginning in 2010-11 with Tunisia, and then engulfing Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. The reaction was a conscious and calculated disengagement.
He tried to
revive the US-Iraq Status of Forces Agreement originally signed in 2008 that
allowed US troops in Iraq. But once the Iraqis refused to extend the scope of
the agreement, Obama announced the full withdrawal of troops before the expiry
of the agreement on December 31, 2011. It was completed on December 16.
But the engagement in Afghanistan continues and the US will stay on even after Obama departs in January 2017. Although its combat role was over in 2014, the remaining 10,000 ground troops can engage in counter insurgency measures.
Obama’s biggest challenge was undoubtedly the Arab Spring beginning in 2010-11 with Tunisia, and then engulfing Libya, Egypt, Yemen, and Syria. The administration’s reaction was a conscious and calculated disengagement. In Tunisia’s struggle against its dictator Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, Obama said the US was “not taking sides” but after the dictator’s flight Obama expressed support for the revolution. In Egypt, the US was initially hesitant to criticise Hosni Mubarak for various reasons but allowed him to fall eventually. In Libya, after a successful intervention to oust Muamaar Gaddafi, the US administration became a silent bystander. On Yemen, the US let Saudi Arabia take the lead.
The American pullout from Iraq and its refusal to take sides in the Arab Spring have imposed a cost. Its neutrality left a vacuum, which was filled by a swarm of Islamist extremists, complicating an already fraught situation. The internecine wars sparked by contending parties in Iraq, Syria and Yemen have taken these countries to the verge of chaos and led to a revival, among other things, of al-Qaeda in the region. But it has been quite eclipsed by Isis, the major result of the anti-western blowback.
The US could not decide between conscious disengagement and qualified intervention. At first it followed the theory that foreign powers can do little in the Iraqi and Syrian conflicts or other “ancient hatreds”. But in August 2014 the administration opened military action against Isis. A month later, Obama sent Secretary of State John Kerry, to persuade nine other NATO members to join US strikes against Islamic State. Since then the coalition has got stronger and more have joined the fight against Isis.
The US task is complicated by the fact that the jihadists and terrorists are inextricably linked. If suppressed in one place, they break out in another.
On Syria,
Obama said the US “don’t have a strategy” as late as July 2014, though US
intelligence had started training Free Syrian Army rebels as soon as the civil
war broke out. But in September 2014 he ordered air strikes in company with
five Arab countries, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain and United Arab
Emirates.
In November
2015, Obama ordered the deployment of ground troops as well. The strikes in
Iraq and Syria are continuing and thousands of US and coalition forces are
stationed in Iraq as military advisors. At the same time, Libya too became a
part of the anti-Isis theatre. The void created by Gaddafi’s overthrow was
never filled by a stable government so it proved, inevitably, conducive to the
growth of extremist forces.
No wonder
Obama admitted last month that his government’s “plan for the day after
intervening in Libya” was not in place and therefore the Libyan intervention
was his worst mistake. The US task is complicated by the fact that the
jihadists and terrorists are inextricably linked. If suppressed in one place,
they break out in another. So while the US and coalition bombing is showing
results in Iraq and Syria, Isis fighters are now relocating to Libya.
***
W
hen Obama
leaves the Oval Office, the Middle East will remain the greatest and most
complex challenge to any successor. It is the centre of death, destruction,
despair and a refugee influx that is already rocking the European Union. The
United Nations estimates that for 2014, half of the total 51 million refugees
and asylum seekers belonged to Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. The ghosts of the
millions killed because of the US war on terror must be wondering why Obama
received the Nobel Peace Prize.
It is not just
civil war and the consequent displacement of civilians that a post-Obama
administration must deal with. Falling oil prices are another major factor. The
trajectory of oil prices is directly linked to the wellbeing of most of the
Middle Eastern states as they are primarily energy exporting economies. The
slump in crude price has affected even the richest, such as Saudi Arabia.
In Obama’s
first term prices were high, $110 to $130 a barrel. But since June 2014 the
bottom seems to have dropped out of the market as it trades around $40. The
period coincides with the rise of Isis in Iraq and Syria. The reasons are many
and varied, including insipid economic growth in many countries including
China, increased oil production in the US and the decision of Organisation of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) not to reduce production. The war in Syria
and Iraq has also seen Isis capturing oil wells and selling oil in the black
market leading to reduction of demand. All the producers are reeling from the
crash.
Oil revenue is the most significant instrument for Arab rulers to keep their restive populations in check. Successive US administrations feel comfortable with autocrats, dictators and family fiefdoms because that means they need to satisfy only one person or family at best to advance their interest in the region. Therefore, the vicious web of high petroleum prices—increased oil revenue, largesse for the people, petrodollar support for Islamic extremists and US domination in the region—is closely linked to US grand plan for the Middle East. The Arab Spring forced Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE to wave many more subsidies at their populations than they used to offer.
For example,
on February 22, 2011, the Saudi King offered a 15 per cent increase in state employee
incomes, unemployment benefits, housing loans and announced the construction of
5 lakh low-income houses. It takes lots of cash to pacify restless populations
with welfare spending. Some analysts including Bank of America think “the era
of Saudi’s material overspending is likely behind us”. That’s why the so-called
break-even fiscal prices (divide the total fixed costs by the desired level of
production) for Gulf states have soared from the $60 a few years ago to about
$90 today.
Not all
OPEC members are on equal footing and the crude slump has different
implications for different countries. Saudi Arabia is comfortable, with a
whopping $750 billion in its piggy bank as a reserve fund. So it can withstand
the burden of declining oil prices for some time while it tries to price out US
shale oil by making it too expensive to extract. There are other motives at
work as well.
The United
Arab Emirates and Kuwait are also on the same ground, with vast reserves that
can be used to run deficits for years. But Iraq, Syria, Iran and Nigeria are
under great strain because of budgetary demands due to their large population
sizes in relation to oil revenues. Iraq and Syria are locked in civil strife
while Iran’s oil economy is hostage to Saudi Arabia’s oil policy which is using
it as a weapon. By flooding the market it is trying to ensure that Iran, which
is about to benefit from the lifting of sanctions by the UN, European Union and
US, will remain under the pump.
***
T
rapped in
the age-old complexities of religion, Iran and Saudi Arabia are the two faces
of Islam—the Shia and Sunni. What started as a small schism after the Prophet
Muhammad’s death is now for all practical purposes irreconcilable. And since
the Safavid Emperor Shah Ismail (1501-22) established control over vast swathes
of land in and around modern Iran, the country converted to Shia Islam, marking
one of the most important turning points in Muslim history.
Since the
Safavid era Iran has been the protector of Shia Islam while Saudi Arabia is the
protector and propagator of the Sunni branch. The rift is not just religious
but now also political and has often been exploited by foreign powers to
advance their national interests.
Photo: Alia Allana
The two
countries are sworn rivals and always ready to support any group or nation that
opposes their rival. Sandwiched between a host of Sunni and at times hostile
countries, Iran feels insecure both militarily and politically. Saudi Arabia
has used its hoard of petrodollars and its position as the home of Islam to
take on Iran. This battle of nerves continues today. It was as a hedge against
this insecurity that Iran started developing a nuclear programme which
attracted collective sanctions from the UN, EU and US on account of its alleged
weaponisation objective. It has caused much economic hardship despite the
country’s immense reserves of oil (136.3 billion barrels).
The “ancient hatreds” are alive and well. Saudi Arabia and its allies accuse Iran of supporting Shia militants in literally every country in the Middle East. It fears that its Shia militias will become ever more active.
The 1979
Islamic revolution saw US-Iran relations hit rock bottom and the US announced
sanctions. In 1984 it declared Iran a “State Sponsor of Terrorism” following the
1983 bombing of the US Marine barracks in Lebanon. The UN also imposed
sanctions on Iran in 2006, increased in intensity after 2010. The objective of
US sanctions was to restrain Iran from supporting terrorism and also to help
its Arabs allies to subdue Iran. UN action related to its nuclear programme.
But
sanctions rarely succeed. So there was a growing interest among all
stakeholders to end them at the earliest. When Hassan Rouhani won the 2013
election, he initiated a diplomatic effort to have the ban lifted. By this time
the US had tasted failure in countries like India, Pakistan and North Korea
after their nuclear tests. The US tried every method including diplomatic
pressure, ever-tighter sanctions and military action but Iran responded with
defiance. In the end the choice was between a military attack on Iran’s nuclear
facilities—something that could have triggered a regional war—and negotiation.
Obama chose the latter and finally, four years of secret negotiation in between
Iran and US resulted in the Vienna deal in July 2014.
Under the
deal, ratified on January 16, 2016, Iran’s nuclear activities will be within
the strict agreed limit and under strong oversight for the next decade. But the
deal also offers a window for Iran to scale up its production of nuclear fuel.
Iran insisted that the crisis was created by vested interests as it never
wanted a nuclear bomb.
The
agreement is considered one of Obama’s biggest foreign policy achievements. But
not everyone is happy. The Arab countries argue that it will not stop Iran from
going nuclear, nor persuade the country to cease supporting extremist
organisations. The “ancient hatreds” are still alive and well, as the countries
opposed to Iran are determined to ensure the deal will not work. The strongest
opposition comes from Saudi Arabia and its allies who accuse Iran of supporting
Shia militants in literally every country in the Middle East. It fears that
since Iran is now under no travel restriction and financial constraint, its
Shia militias will become ever more active, notably in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon,
Yemen, and Afghanistan where Saudi Arabia is sponsoring Sunni groups.
The US-Iran
deal has produced some strange bedfellows. Washington is covertly working with
Iran to bomb Isis. Since its emergence, the US and Iran are on the same page in
Iraq but on opposite sides in Syria.
To counter
growing US-Iran proximity, Saudi Arabia and Israel joined hands. They met
secretly in February 2014, with the first four meetings in the Czech Republic
and Italy. The fifth and last meeting was at Lucknow in May 2015, facilitated
by the government of India. Raja Mohammad Amir Khan of the erstwhile Oudh
kingdom (a Shia scholar from Lucknow with important contacts in the Middle
East) and his two sons facilitated the talks.
Although Iran lacks the stature of Saudi Arabia, its Shia theocracy and patronage of Shia militancy is the mirror of Riyadh’s Sunni-Wahhabi facade. But Iran is far better placed to create unrest in the Middle East.
They were
meant to gather opinion against the coming together of the US and Iran. Israel
and the Saudis talked about regime change in Iran, an Arab regional military
force, and a call for an independent Kurdistan made up of territory now
belonging to Iraq, Turkey and Iran. Israel also wanted to lobby against the
deal and to weaken the Islamic League’s belligerent posture against Israel.
Saudi Arabia on the other hand wanted to find out the level of public support
among Shias for Iran and perhaps the reaction among Sunnis if something
untoward happened between Saudi Arabia and Iran.
As for
Obama, he considers Iran a destabilising factor in the region, threatening
Israel, violating human rights at home, and supporting terrorism abroad. The
Shia Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is also deeply suspicious of US
intensions.
Although
Iran lacks the stature of Saudi Arabia, its Shia theocracy and patronage of
Shia militancy is considered the mirror of Riyadh’s Sunni-Wahhabi facade. But
Iran is far better placed to create unrest in the Middle East. Its
destabilising capacity has already been proved in Syria where it supports the
Alawite Shia regime of Bashar al-Assad; in Lebanon, it supports the Shia
Hezbollah; in Gaza, it backs the Hamas resistance against Israeli domination;
in Yemen, it assists the Houthis against the Arab onslaught and in Iraq, it is
building a new Shia militia.

The lifting
of sanctions means increased revenues of US$1.6 billion a month. There is
growing fear that Iran may use it to match the influence of Saudi Arabia. The
deal has made the Saudis more belligerent on Iran. Riyadh severed relations
with Tehran after demonstrators set fire to the Saudi embassy in the capital in
protest over the execution of a revered Shia preacher in Riyadh. The United
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Sudan—all Sunni states—also cut ties
with Iran. The Saudi government has encouraged Pakistan, the only Muslim
nuclear state, to announce that Pakistan has a special obligation to Saudi
Arabia in this regard. For the first time, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is being
cited in a Middle East context, against a fellow Islamic country. The permanent
five plus one (P5—US, UK, France, China and Russia) + 1(Germany)) and Iran deal
has greatly altered the power balance in Middle East.
***
T
he US
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq convinced the Obama administration not to
pledge more ground troops in any other troubled country in the Arab world or
the Middle East. Therefore, Obama devised a strategy of getting regional powers
to establish order in the troubled region. So he delegated the task of
intervention in the Arab world to Saudi Arabia and other Arab allies. Although
the US provides strategic guidance and intelligence support, there is no offer
of American blood. This job belongs to its Arab allies, primarily to Saudi
Arabia.
For decades
Saudi Arabia brooded over its hoard of petrodollars, spending vast sums on
Wahhabi proselytisation and claiming the status of undisputed patron of Sunni
Islam. All that changed abruptly after the Arab Spring broke out and old
friends in Islamic countries were replaced by either hostile leaders or rebel
groups. Saudi Arabia had no time to think or find a coherent response. To add
insult to injury, the US adopted a policy of cautious disengagement in the region.
So it was up to the Saudis to maintain the peace and Sunni domination. That put
it on collision course with Iran, lurking on every doorstep to augment its Shia
presence wherever it could in the Middle East.
The Arab
Spring dislodged Yemen’s Abdullah Saleh in 2011 and installed Abd Rabbuh Mansur
Hadi as president. The country descended into chaos and in March 2015 Mansur
Hadi was dislodged by the Iran-backed Houthis, an armed Shia political movement
and forces loyal to Abdullah Saleh. The US refrained from direct intervention
leaving Saudi Arabia with no option but to start an air campaign. The US helped
the Saudis to form a coalition of Islamic countries.
The bombing
has converted Yemen into a living ruin of human settlement. Some 80 per cent of
the population are in need of some form of aid. But the Saudis have not been
able to restore Mansur Hadi nor has the US plan to combat terrorism succeeded.
Islamic State and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have profited from the
lawlessness and anarchy. Yemen is and will be a challenge because the hatreds
aroused by Saudi intervention have not run their course. In Oman, too, Saudi
activism continues in the form of cash subsidies for Sultan Qaboos. Oman is
another proxy battlefield for Saudi Arabia and Iran.
Syria is the most complex and tragic of all Obama legacies in the region. For Saudi Arabia, promoter of Sunni extremism, it might be a teaching moment as it comes face to face with one of the monsters it created, Isis.
In the
Syrian theatre Saudi Arabia is indirectly pitted against Iran and directly
against the Sunni Isis. The US is coordinating with the Saudi King to strike
against the Isis and supporting anti-Assad forces. Yemen was a strategic
reverse for the Saudis while Syria was snatched away by Russia’s autumn
intervention that reinforced Bashar al-Assad, Riyadh’s sworn foe. Saudi Arabia
under the leadership of the impulsive defence minister Prince Mohammed bin
Salman sent troops to support the rebels. But this plan also failed. The war is
edging towards stalemate because of too many competing forces including Russia
which openly bombs anti-Assad forces, as well as against Isis.
Syria is
the most complex and tragic of all Obama legacies in the region. For Saudi Arabia,
promoter of Sunni extremism, it might be a teaching moment as it comes face to
face with one of the monsters it created, Isis, with no option but to stay the
course and defeat a terrorists group threatening the house of Saud.
The
“competition between the Saudis and the Iranians—which has helped feed proxy
wars and chaos in Syria and Iraq and Yemen” leaves no easy diplomatic or
military option for Obama’s successors.
***
A
fter
Tunisia, it was Egypt that embraced the Arab Spring most enthusiastically. It
started in January 2011, and within a month, on February 11, the activists were
seeing the downfall of the three-decade-old Hosni Mubarak regime.
His
departure meant the end of the old regime and allowed the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF) to dissolve Parliament and assume executive power.
After a difficult 16-month period of transition general elections were held and
on June 23, 2012 Mohamed Morsi, a US-educated engineer and leader of the Muslim
Brotherhood took the oath as the first democratically elected president of
Egypt. It was the first time in the modern era that the country was being
headed by an Islamist and the first that a freely elected civilian had come to power. But regional leaders were
nervous about the rise of Islamism.
Egypt’s political system has been subservient
to the military since the days of Gamal Abdel Nasser. The military became an
integral part of the state, whose officers served in government posts, the
diplomatic corps, the intelligence and security organizations and the media,
which Nasser nationalised. In his seminal work The Last Pharaoh, Aladdin
Elaasar described Nasser’s dictatorship, which Mubarak inherited, as a “triple
threat”, a dictatorship combining three elements: the personalist, the military
and the single-party dictatorship.
The SCAF,
which oversaw the messy transition in 2012, had curtailed the president’s power
and consolidated its own grip on national security policy. Morsi found himself
trapped between the growing aspirations of Egyptians and an uncooperative army.
Egypt was polarised between his Islamist supporters and rest of society.
Morsi’s first anniversary on June 30, 2013 was greeted with protests by
millions of Egyptians which prompted the military headed to dislodge him and
suspend the Constitution until an alternative arrangement was made. Morsi was
arrested and charged under various sections and sentenced to life imprisonment
in 2015.
Meanwhile,
interim President Adly Mansour placed a draft constitution for referendum and
on January 14-15, 2015 Egyptian voted it with a staggering 98 per cent approval
though voter turnout was 38 per cent.
Sections of the Muslim Brotherhood have joined Isis, which has profited from the chaos, to wreak havoc in Egypt.
Earlier, in
May 2014, Gen Abdel Fattah al-Sisi had won an election boycotted by the Muslim
Brotherhood to re-establish the military’s grip on government. Soon, faced with
militant attacks and a struggling economy, the general turned to religion to
bolster his authority and justify a crackdown on his rivals.
Since
al-Sisi became president the number of death sentences has gone up, which is
indicative of the deteriorating state of what little democracy was established
after the 2011 uprising. The general has suppressed democratic practices and
civil liberties and adopted brutal methods and repression to establish his
authority.
A worse
outcome is that sections of the Muslim Brotherhood have joined Isis, which has
profited from the chaos, to wreak havoc in Egypt. The military is fighting the
local Isis unit and on the pretext of fighting terror censoring the press and
monitoring radical publications. There is growing concern that Egypt is on the
perilous path of polarisation and soon may embrace more violent struggle.

The US
seems to find al-Sisi’s strong man avatar pleasing and Obama is leader-centric
on this score. Washington showed little interest in Cairo after Morsi was
deposed. When the European Union suspended the package of $5 billion allocated
in November 2012, American packages materialised. In August 2015, the US
offered F-16 fighter planes, re-launched the US-Egypt “strategic dialogue” and
promised to resume “Bright Star”, the joint military exercise suspended after
the coup.
The State
Department considers engagement with al-Sisi the best available option. In
fact, there is no alternative as al-Sisi is the elected leader and trying to
restore peace in the country. The US is a champion of democratic values but
seems content to turn a blind eye in the case of Egypt. Obama advocates
military assistance to Egypt in four areas—border security, counterterrorism,
Sinai security and maritime security.
Egypt has
adopted a uniform policy so far as the US is concerned and at no time withheld
cooperation. So a new administration will face no rift but the people of Egypt
would continue to be repressed and violence remains a very real possibility.
The government
has jailed more than 40,000 political opponents, second only to Syria. The
country is more vulnerable to violence and insurgency today than ever before.
Moreover, Egypt’s ineffective counterterrorism policies are fuelling the
insurgency it claims to be fighting. National and international observers agree
that the repression in extraordinarily high, perhaps unprecedented in modern
history. There is no organised force at present to counter al-Sisi. The US has
some influence but it is not making human rights an issue as it has its own
interest in mind. Nevertheless, if its approach is not balanced it would be
legitimising political repression in Egypt.
***
US
intervention in the Middle East was guided by its ambition to convert the
region into a fiefdom and derive maximum profit under the garb of imparting
democracy and welfare. The US understood that the region’s vast oil reserve was
an essential component of its policy to dominate the world.
The Middle East contains 64 per cent of the world’s oil reserves. With it, the US could control the world for a long time to come.
Its
involvement began immediately after the First World War, when the oil majors
Exxon and Mobil became partners of the Iraqi Oil Company. In 1927, Gulf also
started to operate in Kuwait, while Standard Oil of California (SoCal) won the
first concession to explore oil in Saudi Arabia in 1933. SoCal invited Texaco
to join in. They started to export oil from Saudi Arabia in 1938 and
immediately invited Exxon and Mobil to become partners in the newly established
Aramco. After World War II, the US placed a premium on its interests in the
region due to its oil reserves, its strategic location south of the Soviet
Union, the importance of the Suez Canal as a passage to the Far East, and the
strategic location of British military bases in the Suez Canal zone that could
be used to launch a counterattack against the Soviet Union.
The Middle
East contains 64 per cent of the world’s oil reserves and the US believed it
could not fight a protracted war without that oil. With it, the US could
control the world for a long time to come. That is why it preferred to deal
with dictators rather than elected leaders. The 9/11 attacks prompted it to
charge into Afghanistan in 2001 but it overplayed its hand by going to war with
Iraq in 2003. By destroying the Iraqi state it set off reverberations across
the region that, ultimately, led to a civil war in Syria. The 2003 invasion
created conditions for a movement like Isis.
It is worth
noting that the US was supporting elements of Isis in 2012 to take on the
regime of President Bashar al-Assad. A US Defence Intelligence Agency report of
August 12, 2012, identifies al-Qaeda in Iraq (which became Isis) and fellow
Salafists as the “major forces driving the insurgency in Syria”—and states that
“western countries, the Gulf states and Turkey” were supporting the
opposition’s efforts to take control of eastern Syria.
The US, UK, the Gulf States, Saudi Arabia,
Qatar and Turkey supported the rise of Isis as a way to undermine Bashar.
Before the US intervention, Syria was a prototype of pre-2003 Iraq with a high
standard of living, and high quality of education, where women and minorities
enjoyed equal rights. It became an American target for regime change after the
Anglo-American alliance used Sunni jihadist groups to destroy Libya and
dethrone Muamaar Gaddafi on the pretext of protecting Libyan civilians. Under
cover of the Arab Spring, as declassified documents showed, the US promoted
Isis against Bashar.
In 2012,
the Obama administration created a “rat line”, a back channel highway into
Syria through which weapons and ammunition from Libya could reach the Syrian
opposition including affiliates of al-Qaeda via southern Turkey. In the same
year a secret agreement was reached between Obama and Turkish President Tayyip
Erdoğan. The CIA and UK’s MI6 were responsible for channelling funds from
Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar and arms from Gaddafi’s arsenals into Syria. The
operation was carried out under the supervision of CIA Director David Petraeus.
It set the
stage for a multi-dimensional civil struggle in Syria. On the invitation of the
Iraqi government, on June 15, 2014, Obama ordered dozens of US troops in
response to offensives by the very Isis it had supported against Bashar a
couple of years earlier. In his August 7, 2014, address to the nation, Obama
described the Isis advance across Iraq as a persecution of the Yazidis, a
religious minority, that necessitated US military action. With the passing of
time the ambit of US attacks increased and by February 4, 2015, the US had
4,500 troops in Iraq.
When civil
war rocked Syria, Isis Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent his deputy Muhammad
al-Joulani to set up Jabhat al-Nusra in 2011. Soon it proved to be the most
capable organisation among the numerous Bashar rivals fighting his army and
among themselves. Back in Iraq, Isis exploited the anger of the Sunni minority
against the Shia sectarian government in Baghdad. Isis channelled that Sunni
discontent and al-Nusra’s strength to launch an ambitious military campaign
against the Iraqi army in the Sunni belt. Soon al-Nusra entered the Isis fold
to overwhelm Fallujah and Mosul. After the success, Baghdadi declared himself
Caliph of the Islamic State.
Obama understood the cost of removing a ruler from experience in Iraq and Libya. The spectre of post-Bashar chaos was real.
Although
Obama ordered bombing in Syria he decided not to send troops. Curiously, except
for China, the other permanent UN Security Council members are bombing the Isis
in Syria but there is no visible victory on the ground. The players involved
have different objectives. For example, Saudi Arabia and Turkey wanted to restrict
the growth of Isis but are happy with the group’s ability to make a dent in the
strategic depth of Shia Iran. Similarly, the US, France and UK who are
participating in Iraq and Syria against Isis wanted Bashar to go but the job of
removing is delegated to Isis affiliates. Russia on the other hand wanted Isis
defeated but Bashar to remain in his position.
After the
end of Cold War, this is the first time that the US and Russia are standing
face to face in Syria. While the US is firmly against Bashar, Russia has
provided every possible support including ground troops since September 2015 to
keep him on his throne. In Syria, the US wanted a replay of Libya, Egypt and
Yemen but faced failure. The US calculation went awry as Russia and Iran played
their cards successfully to keep Bashar intact.
Washington
was under pressure from allies like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar to dislodge
Bashar. But Obama understood the cost of removing a ruler from experience in
Iraq and Libya. The spectre of post-Bashar chaos was real. Therefore, he wanted
to build an opposition that would fight both the Syrian army and the jihadists.
This plan never worked.
***
M
eanwhile,
the Iraq-Syria region became a human catastrophe with an uncontrollable refugee
crisis, further complicating everything. This has forced the US and its allies
to look for a solution and to tone down their anti-Bashar approach. Although
Obama wants him gone, he is reconciled to the prospect of seeing the Syrian
leader around for the time being.
Moscow has
a huge stake in Syria as the coastal city of Tartus is the only Russian naval
base outside the former Soviet region. Its strategic depth in West Asia depends
entirely on Syria. Therefore, although Moscow persuaded Bashar to destroy his
chemical weapons stockpile in 2013, it determinedly opposed his removal.
As the
stalemate continued and more than 2,50,000 people were killed in the protracted
war, the UN Security Council finally came to an agreement by passing Resolution
2254. Adopted unanimously in December 2015, it calls for a ceasefire, a new
government in Damascus within six months, free and fair election and a
constitution within 18 months. The timeline is too tight and the challenge on
the ground is enormous.
Those who
reached the negotiating table are representatives of the Syrian Ba’athist
government and the opposition. Kurdish forces, radical Sunni groups and Isis
were not party to this negotiation. So the battle is still on in the area
controlled by Isis and al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate. After a long and
meandering beginning, the talks returned on track in March, when the US and
Russia agreed to aim for a draft version of a new constitution for Syria by
August 2016.
The consensus for now seems to be that there cannot be endless internecine fighting at the cost of civilian lives. There is consensus among all and even among rival powers that every country from the vast spectrum of participants in the Syrian theatre must unite in finding a solution. But that is easier said than done. The next US president will be facing the toughest of tests in Syria where the guns have still not fallen silent and where rival forces possess the capacity to enlist the support of their respective backers at short notice. If that happens again, the next incumbent will have just cause to rue Obama’s intermittent meddling in this volatile region.